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Abstract 
As a member of the developed world, Hong Kong is dealing with the common 
problem of an aging population.  Hong Kong’s answer to the demand of retirement 
protection is the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) System.  Launched in 2000, the MPF 
System is a compulsory, privately managed, and fully funded contribution scheme for 
employees, and this project intends to evaluate whether the challenges of retirement 
protection in Hong Kong are met with the implementation of the system. 
 The MPF System will be analysed in terms of its mode of governance and the 
policy tools that fit in the study.  Theories on the modes of governance and policy tools 
will be discussed, and a background of old age protection in Hong Kong will be laid out 
for better understanding of the historical development. 
 The main assessment is on the MPF System, its current development and 
proposed way forward will provide a better picture of the situation of old age protection 
in Hong Kong.  Although the project has its limitations, attempts to make 
recommendations on the topic will provide more fruit for thought. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Focus, Objectives and Background of the Project 
This project addresses the topic of retirement protection in Hong Kong.  Its 
objective is to assess the evolution of retirement protection in a governance and policy 
tools approach through the study of the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) System.  The 
effectiveness or fitness of the MPF System as a policy tool to alleviate the problem of an 
ageing population is also assessed. 
The aging population is a common problem in the developed world.  As the baby 
boomers enter the retirement age, governments in the developed world must find a way to 
support the senior citizens and not bankrupt the treasury.  In Hong Kong, the MPF 
System is the present policy tool deployed to alleviate the impact of an ageing population. 
The MPF system was launched in 2000, and it is a compulsory, privately 
managed, and fully funded contribution scheme for employees in Hong Kong.  Its set up 
was in response to the World Bank’s ‘Three Pillars of Old Age Protection’ in 1994, and 
the Hong Kong government enacted the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance 
(MPFSO) in 1995 to regulate the MPF system. 
Research Questions and Related Propositions: Theory and Practice 
This project focuses on the evolution of governance and policy tools of the 
retirement protection over time with an emphasis on the present MPF System.  In 
response, the project addresses the following research questions: 
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1) Why and how do governments seek to respond to the retirement needs of their citizens? 
2) What has the Hong Kong government done in responding to the retirement needs of its 
citizens? 
3) Why did the Hong Kong government decide on the MPF System as a particular 
response to the issue of retirement? 
4) How successful has the MPF System been in terms of appropriate evaluative criteria? 
An ageing population may lead to widespread social problems.  A responsible 
government would prioritise retirement protection as a prime policy in a regime, so as the 
Hong Kong government.  Since no policy tool is perfect and universally applicable, 
different regimes deploy specific policy or range of policies to handle the issue, and in 
turn manifest governance mode. 
The Hong Kong government deployed different policy tools in alleviating the 
impact of an ageing population over time.  At present, the government upholds the belief 
of positive non-interventionist approach by deploying the MPF System as the main policy 
tool.  The MPF System itself, at the same time, is incorporating bundles of tools.  The 
MPF System as a policy evolves constantly to meet social changes.  However, the 
effectiveness of the system is a subject of challenge ever since its deployment.   
Through answering the above research questions, this project seeks for the 
understanding on the evolution of retirement protection policy in Hong Kong with a 
particular attention to the present MPF System.  
12 
 
Overview of the Analytical Framework 
Chapter 2 establishes the analytical framework for the project. It discusses on the 
theories of governance and policy tools intended as the basis for an analysis of the MPF 
System.  It considers different types of governance and policy tools. 
The matrix of Knill and Tosun’s (2012) mode of governance is precisely the 
foundation of the project when we look into the MPF System with due regard to the 
development of retirement protection in Hong Kong over the years.  The degree of legal 
obligation and cooperation between the public and private sectors are to be highlighted in 
the discussion of the design and running of the MPF System.  Furthermore, this chapter 
introduces the six types of policy tools suggested by Frieberg (2010), and they will be 
applied in the analysis of the MPF System which is in itself a tool to use tools with a 
view to provide retirement protection.  A number of evaluative criteria will be introduced 
whilst attempt will also be made in subsequent chapters to evaluate the effectiveness of 
MPF System in particular, the fitness of tools that the Mandatory Provident Fund 
Schemes Authority (MPFA) has employed under the system. 
Research Methodology 
In the project, a comprehensive academic literature review on the mode of 
governance, policy tools and associated evaluative criteria on assessing its’ effectiveness 
establishes the analytical framework.  It provides the basis for subsequent analysis on 
empirical data. 
Information on empirical findings and analysis are primarily based on desktop 
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research.  References are made to the public domain of official information and related 
data released by competent authorities.  These data derived mainly from websites, press 
release, speeches, discussion paper of the MPFA, Social Welfare Department, Census 
and Statistics Department, Consumer Council, Legislative Council, etc. 
The desktop research approach is considered to be appropriate for the project.  
Retirement protection is an important public policy in Hong Kong.  The policy evolves 
constantly with extensive study and discussion.  The history and current information on 
the retirement protection policy including the MPF System and other relevant topics are 
comprehensive and are readily available online.  These data are extensive for the purpose 
of establishing empirical findings and analysis in the project. 
Outline of Following Chapters 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 defines the concept of governance and 
policy tools.  It establishes the analytical framework with particular reference to the 
modes of governance addressed by Knill and Tosun (2012), policy tools by Freiberg’s 
(2010) and the evaluative criteria by Winfield and Rossell (2010, 1993).  This framework 
guides and informs subsequent empirical analysis. 
Thereafter, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 analyse the evolution of retirement protection 
including the MPF System based on the framework set in Chapter 2.  A discussion on the 
situation of Hong Kong’s retirement protection before and after the implementation of the 
MPF System shows how the governance and policy tools evolve over time.  Based on the 
type of governance and policy tools chosen, Chapter 3 focuses on the past of retirement 
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protection in Hong Kong, and Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the present and future 
developments of the MPF System. 
Chapter 6 concludes the analysis of the MPF System as Hong Kong’s policy tools 
to alleviate the impact of an ageing population.  Selected experiences of old age 
protection from outside of Hong Kong are drawn on briefly as a comparison with the 
MPF System.  Limitations and recommendations of the project are noted. 
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Chapter 2 - Analytical Framework 
Introduction 
This chapter establishes an analytical framework to structure, guide and inform 
the empirical study in subsequent chapters.  The framework comprises the key concept of 
governance, policy tools and relevant evaluative criteria for assessing their effectiveness. 
In a governmental system, there are different modes of governance type and may 
vary across different policy areas or societies.  Different governance modes indicate 
dominance on the use of certain types of policy tool as a means of regulation or 
intervention, to induce individuals or groups to make decisions or actions compatible 
with public policies (Freiberg, 2010).  Whilst it is difficult to define a ‘perfect’ mode of 
governance which depends on its fitness with the particular government policy and 
society, it is therefore common for governance modes to shift from one to another to take 
place over time in a single society.  Although there is not a perfect governance mode, its 
ancillary use of policy tools could be assessed based on a number of evaluative criteria, 
which could help account for its effectiveness and fitness in responding to the policy 
issue. 
Definition of Governance 
Governance or good governance, as a concept, is a prominent term in social 
science research in particular in public policy analysis.  Nonetheless, there is a lack of 
general accepted definition (Kooiman et al., 2008).  Governance as a new process of 
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governing can be referred to the development of the governing approaches where 
boundaries between public, private and non-profit societal sectors blur with the 
increasing trend of corporate management and marketisation (Kooiman et al., 2003).  
This is a governing process requiring coordination among different sectors and is often 
associated with non-hierarchical modes of political steering.  It distinguishes from 
government, a traditional hierarchical mode. 
In contrast, governance can be defined in the broad term as a classification of 
modes of political steering with attempts to coordinate individual action to achieve policy 
goals.  It includes both hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes (Knill & Tosun, 2012).  
In the boarder sense of governance, there are different modes and can vary in different 
policy areas in the same country. 
According to Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001), governance is defined as the 
“regimes, laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, 
prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goals and services.”  
Governance is widespread in both public and private sectors, in characterising both 
global and local arrangements, and in reference to both formal and informal norms and 
understandings.  Since the term has a strong intuitive appeal, precise definitions are 
seldom thought to be necessary by those who use it.  As a result, “when authors identify 
‘governance’ as important to achieving policy or organisational objectives, it may be 
unclear whether the reference is to organisational structure, administrative processes, 
managerial judgement, systems of incentives and rules, administrative philosophies, or a 
combination of these elements” (Lynn, Henrich, and Hill, 2000). 
17 
 
Lynn et al.’s (2000) model of governance as an analytic framework is as follows: 
O = f {E, C, T, S, M}; where 
O = outputs/outcomes.  The end product of a governance regime 
E = environmental factors.  These can include political structures, levels 
of authority, economic performance, the presence or absence of 
competition among suppliers, resource levels and dependencies, 
legal framework, and the characteristics of a target population 
C = client characteristics.  The attributes, characteristics, and behaviour 
of clients 
T = treatments.  These are the primary work or core processes of the 
organisations in the governance regime.  They include organisational 
missions and objectives, recruitment and eligibility criteria, methods 
for determining eligibility, and programme treatments or 
technologies 
S = structures.  These include organisational type, level of coordination 
and integration among the organisations in the governance regime, 
relative degree of centralised control, functional differentiation, 
administrative rules or incentives, budgetary allocations, contractual 
arrangements or relationships, and institutional culture and values 
M= managerial role and actions.  This includes leadership characteristics, 
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staff-management relations, communications, methods of decision 
making, professional/career concerns, and mechanisms of 
monitoring, control, and accountability. 
Types of Governance 
Knill and Tosun (2012), with reference to hierarchical intervention and market 
contribution, defined a different government ruling model and categorised it into four 
ideal types, namely: 
i. Interventionist Governance 
ii. Regulated Self-Governance  
iii. Cooperative Governance 
iv. Private Self-Governance 
The four ideal types are differentiated in mainly two dimensions: the cooperation 
of public and private actors and degree of legal obligation (see Table 2.1) (Knill and 
Lendschow, 2002). 
Table 2.1 – The matrix of Knill and Tosun’s Mode of Governance 
 
 
 Cooperation of public and private actors 
High Low 
Degree of  
legal obligation 
High 
Regulated  
Self-Governance 
Interventionist Governance 
Low Cooperative Governance Private Self-Governance 
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Interventionist Governance 
Interventionist Governance is the mode of governance with a high degree of legal 
role but with rare cooperation between public and private actors.  This indicates that the 
government takes most dominant role in formulating and deciding policies.  Public and 
private actors do not have much power or role in making policy decisions.  Knill and 
Tosun state that it is a hierarchical relationship between public and private actors, with 
the state intervening “from above” into the society through highly detailed and legally 
binding requirement, i.e. Command and Control mechanism. 
Interventionist Governance is similar to the concept of “governance by hierarchy” 
which indicates an asymmetrical relationship between public and private actors.  The 
public or state establishes formal rules and procedures that bind both the private and 
public sectors into compliance with preset public policies.  Private actors have little or no 
inference on policymaking, but simply comply with rules and regulations established by 
the state.  One of the advantages of governance by hierarchy is that the states produce fair 
conditions for all players in the supply of common goods, and therefore the framework of 
daily economic activities is reliable.  In contrast, the state being the sole player in policy 
setting may not know about the actual problems which the society is confronting.  
Regulated Self-Governance 
Regulated Self-Governance is the mode of governance with a high degree of legal 
role as well as high cooperation between public and private stakeholders.  It indicates that 
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although the state may still play a dominant role in the final decision on policy contents 
and regulatory arrangements, the society participates on the basis of clearly formalised 
and institutionalised procedures (Knill & Tosun, 2012).  Involvement of society in 
formulating policies might be much higher than that in Interventionist Governance, but 
the government or the policyholder should have the power on determining the policies, 
i.e. the government hierarchically defines the rules of the game for public and private 
sectors (Knill & Tosun, 2012). 
Cooperative Governance 
Cooperative Governance is a model with low degree of legal obligation but a high 
degree of cooperation with the society.  It indicates that the roles of the policyholder are 
relatively low (or even without policyholder) and the stakeholders in the policies (public 
or private sectors) may be in a much higher position in formulating policies.  The 
stakeholders might cooperate, decide and involve throughout themselves in the whole 
policy developing process before implementation.  Knill and Tosun (2012) clearly reveal 
that the implementation of public policies is based on close cooperation between state 
and society and the focuses of this governance are: 
i. to enhance the cooperation between private and public sectors;  
ii. to allow for the negotiation of cooperative arrangements by 
including a broad range of public and private actors; and 
iii. to replace hierarchical intervention by voluntary agreements 
between public and private actors. 
However, Cooperative Governance is different from Regulated Self-Governance 
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as it involves less legal binding rules.  Cooperative Governance may assume the position 
between network and market governance.  Cooperative Governance may also correspond 
to B. Guy Peters’ deregulated government which argues for the unleash of potential 
power and creativity of government through deregulation. 
Private Self-Governance 
Private Self-Governance, on the other hand, has a low legal binding duty and also 
a low cooperation between the public and private sectors.  It is a concept similar to 
“governance by market” where solely market forces allocate goods and services i.e., 
based on prices without the intervention of the state.  Since market governance assumes 
that all players are rational in making decisions i.e., with a profit making mentality, 
therefore negative externalities, which harm third parties, are likely produced. 
The four types of governance and political context  
Knill and Tosun (2012) have specified that governance type could not be 
understood in the light of mere ideological orientations or political preferences of the 
governing party.  It should instead be interpreted with the backdrop of specific 
institutional and political structures, which vary across countries and policy sectors. 
In adopting the governance type which could best serve its purpose, it is essential 
for policymakers to understand clearly the existing problems before making such 
decision.  Furthermore, the characteristics of the state, such as culture, tradition, social 
expectations, ability of the public and private sectors are also crucial factors to be taken 
into consideration when deciding what type of governance to adopt.  Knill and Tosun 
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(2012) have summarised a list of crucial criteria as follows: 
i. The basic factor affecting the governance capacity of national 
government; 
ii. The particular institutional arrangements, i.e. the legal, 
administrative and political system; 
iii. The degree of organisation and the willingness to contribute to the 
provision of common goods by the private organisations; and 
iv. The ability of the private and public sectors in implementing the 
policies. 
It is rare to see a specific governance type applied to all policy areas within a 
country.  Rather, the type of governance differs in different policy areas, and there may 
often be changes in the ruling party in a democratic country.  “Appropriate governance 
arrangements have to be designed carefully by taking into account the specific 
institutional and problem structures at hand” (Knill &Tosun, 2012).  Furthermore, a right 
choice on a specific type of governance in a policy area does not necessarily bring about 
success; whereas the utilisation of appropriate policy tools in the policy implementation 
will be another important factor. 
Regulation by Policy Tools 
Social order is the result of a complex interplay between non-legal norms, cultural, 
religious and economic practices, more formal norms and the edicts of government, and it 
is in this broad sense that all the behaviour are regulated (Parker, 2000).  It is therefore 
believed to be the case that regulation has occurred for as long as government existed 
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(Mclean, 2004).   Amongst its great variety of definitions, ‘regulation’ can simply be 
regarded as “mechanisms of social control or influence affecting behaviour, from 
whatever source, whether intentional or not” (Baldwin, Scott and Hood, 1998), whilst 
legal instruments and rules are two common examples of this.  It is for good reasons that 
regulations help manage risks of harm, create an environment of trust and reduce the 
economic and psychological transaction costs of negotiating life in a very complex 
society where labour is minutely divided, government uses ‘tools’ with a view to bring 
out desired regulatory outcome even though some may find it oppressive, burdensome or 
restrictive (Freiberg, 2010). 
Definition of policy tools 
The terms ‘tools’, ‘instruments’, ‘methods’, ‘measures’ and ‘interventions’ are all 
used in the literature to represent the means by which the behaviour of individuals and 
groups were influenced with desired regulatory outcomes produced.  Salamon (2002) 
defines tools as “an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to 
address a public problem”.  Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) consider that “instruments 
are tools employed by institutions to do what they wish to do”.  Landry and Varone (2005) 
suggest “a policy instrument, or a tool, as means of intervention by which governments 
attempt to induce individuals and groups to make decisions and take actions compatible 
with public policies”.  Freiberg (2010) highlights that “the tools of governments are, in 
essence, things of cultural significance that can be concentrated or amassed and used to 
influence behaviour”.  Whilst there is no settled or recognised definition of policy tools, 
for the purpose of this project, there is no intention or attempt to establish a definitive 
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definition of policy but to examine its fitness for the purpose in bringing out the desired 
regulatory outcome. 
Classification of policy tools 
On the other hand, policy tools could be classified in terms of its modes (models) 
and the roles that the government takes up.  Some models derived from the ‘command 
and control’ role of the government, others include the deployment of wealth, harnessing 
markets, use of information, direct action, conferral of protected rights and liabilities, 
enforced self-regulations, co-regulation, corporate compliance systems, incentive-based 
systems…etc.  Some other classifications based on the strategies of intervention such as 
mandates, inducements, capacity building and system changing (McConnell and Enmore); 
the underlying modality of control that is intended to influence behaviour: command 
(legal rules), competition (economic instruments), communication (social norms, 
disclosure, advertising), consensus (cooperation, contracts, partnerships and self-
regulation) and code (architecture, techno-regulation) (Morgan and Yeung, 2007).  It is 
also classified accordingly to the role of government and the type of resources used, for 
example: information, authority, treasure and the organisational resources of government 
(Hood, 1983); whereas categorised into economic tools, transactional regulation, 
authorisation as regulation, structural regulation, informational regulation and legal 
regulation (Freiberg, 2010). 
Freiberg’s types of policy tools 
Freiberg’s (2010) considers regulations pertain to the essential underlying 
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principle of the use of power.  He classifies tools according to its nature with six broad 
forms of power which can be employed by the government to produce behavioural 
change as follows: 
- Economic tools 
- Transactional regulation 
- Authorisation as regulation 
- Structural regulation 
- Informational regulation 
- Legal regulation 
Economic tools utilise economic power and it is a means of economic regulation.  
It involves the manipulation of the production, allocation or use of material resources 
such as money or property, in all its form, so as to bring about behavioural change.  
Transactional regulation is a variant of economic regulation where the form of the tool 
assumes great importance.  Examples of transactional regulations are contract, contract 
disqualification and grants. 
Authorisation as regulation can be described as the exclusive power that 
governments have to confer benefits by authorising or permitting certain forms of 
conduct is a major resource which can then be deployed to direct or prohibit activities.  
For instance, licensing, registration and accreditation are some commonly known 
regulatory measures.  Structural regulation pertains to the physical power, or structural 
regulation, relates to the ability to manipulate the physical environment to influence 
action.  Informational regulation relates to access to knowledge or beliefs such as the 
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requirement on disclosure of information and identification of performance indicator.  
Legal regulation pertains to the ability to invoke the mechanisms of the legal apparatus 
for the purpose of applying or not applying other resources (or tools) through a 
legitimated authority. 
Features of Freiberg’s classification of policy tools incorporate with the concept 
that any resource of cultural significance can be used by governments to influence 
behaviour.  It is broader than an approach that regards government regulation as rules and 
sanctions.  Under this approach, the government can be regarded as having many roles: as 
authoriser and facilitator, as economic actor, as trading partner and as information 
provider.  In each of these capacities, government can influence action and produce 
outcomes often more effectively than through rule-based mechanisms (Freiberg, 2010). 
Fitness of Policy Tools 
In order to assess whether a specific policy tool can bring about the desired 
regulatory outcome in a cost-effective way, we need to know how to assess the fitness of 
policy tools.  According to Coglianese and Lazer, the fittest policy tool is one that “under 
given conditions, achieves the greatest net social gain or that minimises both the 
regulated entities’ compliance costs and the government‘s costs of selecting and 
implementing a standard that achieves a given regulatory objective” (Coglianese and 
Lazer, 2003).  However, many scholars including Coglianese and Lazer, suggest that 
there is no one fittest policy tool and it all depends upon a number of factors with various 
evaluation criteria. 
Factors for fitness of policy tools 
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Regarding the factors for fitness of policy tools, different scholars suggest 
different factors.  For example, May suggests that the types of firms, the complexity of 
tasks and the potential for harm or risk associated with the industry would be the main 
factors (May, 2007); while Coglianese and Lazer suggest that the main factors are the 
homogeneity of regulated entities and the capacity of the regulator to assess outputs 
(Coglianese and Lazer, 2003); Hoberg suggests the characteristics of the problem being 
addressed and the political environment in which standards are developed (Hoberg, 2003); 
Gunningham suggests the motivations of the actors and industry being regulated 
(Gunningham, 2007); while Howlett and Rayner suggest the capacity of both the private 
and public sectors (Howlett and Rayner, 2006). 
It is considered that all of the factors are appropriate, and some of them are quite 
similar, such as the factor on the capacity of the regulator to assess outputs suggested by 
Coglianese and Lazer, and the factor on the capacity of both the private and public 
sectors suggested by Howlett and Rayner actually focus on the same aspect.  All-in-all, it 
is considered that the factors suggested by Howlett and Rayner are more comprehensive.  
They also develop a framework according to these two factors that, if both the private 
sector capacity and the state capacity are high, regulated self-regulation may be the best 
choice; if the private sector capacity is high and the state capacity is low, private self-
regulation may be the best choice; if the private sector capacity is low and the state 
capacity is high, low command and control regulation may be the best choice; while if 
both the private sector capacity and the state capacity are low, then there is ineffective 
regulation (Howlett and Rayner, 2006).   
Evaluation criteria for fitness of policy tools 
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Regarding the evaluation criteria for fitness of policy tools, it is noted that there 
are not much scholars having concrete evaluation criteria suggested.  Nevertheless, both 
Winfield and Rossell suggest four similar evaluation criteria, which are effectiveness, 
economic efficiency, distributional fairness and political acceptability, to assess the 
fitness of policy tools.   
In brief, the criterion on effectiveness means the degree to which the approach is 
likely to be successful and precise in achieving desired outcomes; another criterion on 
economic efficiency is mainly about the costs to society as a whole, governing agencies 
and regulated entities of the proposed regime; the criterion on distributional fairness is 
about the fairness of the distribution of costs and benefits; while the last criterion on 
political acceptability is the likelihood that a proposed approach will be supported by 
politicians (Winfield, 2010; Rossell, 1993). 
World Bank’s Multi-Pillar Model 
On top of the types of governance and policy tools, the World Bank’s Multi-Pillar 
Model (i.e. Three-Pillar Model suggested in 1994 and Five-Pillar Model in 2005) is also 
essential and crucial in the study of the retirement protection policy in Hong Kong. 
In view of the rapid demographic transition as a result of rising life expectancy 
and declining fertility, the proportion of the elderly people in the general population is 
growing rapidly (World Bank, 1994).  To address the ageing population, the World Bank 
issued the ‘Policy Research Report – Adverting the Old Age Crisis’ in 1994, to better 
protect the old age group and to promote sustainable growth.  The World Bank studied 
different retirement protection policies, including the tax-financed model, the mandatory 
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saving model and voluntary saving model.  However, the study revealed that neither of 
them could be sustainable as a single pillar system was like putting all eggs in one basket 
and they will be in serious trouble if the basket, either public or private, breaks. Thus, 
broad diversification across differing financial and managerial sources would be the best 
way to insure in an uncertain world and the Multi-Pillar Model was introduced in that 
context.  In 1994, the World Bank’s Multi-Pillar Model only conspired three unique 
pillars, which were introduced as follows and summarised at Table 2.2 below: 
Pillar I - Mandatory Publicly Managed Pillar 
The first pillar has the objective of reducing old age poverty and co-insuring 
against a multitude of risks.  Through government taxation, this pillar has the unique 
capacity to support the old people or the needy by redistributing the incomes from the 
rich to the poor.  This pillar can co-insure the public at large against long spells of low 
investment returns, recession, and private market failures by using the public money.  
Pillar II – Mandatory Privately Managed Pillar 
The second pillar could be the mandatory personal saving accounts or, in some 
cases, mandatory occupational plans.  This pillar should be fully funded and privately 
managed by the employers and employees, but it should also be regulated to prevent 
malpractices or misuse of the money.  It might also boost capital accumulation and 
financial market development and reduce political pressure to expand the public pillar. 
Pillar III – Voluntary Pillar 
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The third pillar will be the voluntary occupational or personal saving plans.  In 
case any person wants to have a better protection in the retirement, he/she can keep the 
personal savings until retirement so as to have additional protection in the future.  This 
high saving rate of the public can also reduce the political pressure to expand the public 
pillar as well. 
Table 2.2 – Summary of Three-Pillar Model 
Pillar  Objective  Form  Financing  Outcome  
Pillar I –  
Mandatory Publicly 
Managed pillar  
Redistribution 
and insurance  
Means-tested, 
minimum pension 
guarantee or flat rate  
Tax- 
financed  
Poverty 
reduction  
Pillar II –  
Mandatory Privately 
Managed Pillar  
Saving and 
insurance  
Mandatory personal 
savings plan/ 
occupational plan  
Regulated 
and fully- 
funded 
Forced 
saving  
Pillar III –  
Voluntary Pillar  
Saving and 
insurance  
Voluntary personal 
savings plan/ 
occupational plan  
Fully- 
funded  
Voluntary 
saving  
Source: The World Bank (1994) 
In light of demographic change and the ease of adaptation of other countries in the 
Multi-Pillar Model, the World Bank further enhanced and modified its model to the Five-
Pillar in its report – “Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century: An International 
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Perspective on Pension Systems and Reform” in 2005.  Based on the three original pillars, 
the 2005 report added two more pillars: a universal or means-tested basic government 
pension and monetary sources from informal support such as family support, other 
security programme and fixed assets.  The Five-Pillar Model is summarised below 
(LegCo’s Paper, 2011): 
Pillar 0 – non-contributory basic pension plan financed by the state with 
the objective of providing elderly people with a minimal level of 
protection; 
Pillar I – mandatory earnings-related public pension plan; 
Pillar II – mandatory earnings-related occupational or private pension 
plans; 
Pillar III – voluntary contributions to occupational or private pension 
plans; and 
Pillar IV – non-financial support including access to informal support 
(e.g. family support), other formal social security programmes (e.g. 
health care and/or housing), and other individual financial and non-
financial assets (e.g. homeownership and reverse mortgages). 
The Multi-Pillar Model might provide better redistributions, more productive 
savings with lower social cost.  Also, it might be able to reach the goal of better 
retirement protection by reducing the political, investment and country specific risks.  
However, whether the government can fully adopt the World Bank’s model will largely 
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depend on what type of governance it adopts and what policy tools it applies with 
reference to the social, economical and political context of the countries. 
Concluding Comments 
This chapter introduces the analytical framework which serves as the foundation 
to structure, guide and inform the discussion of the empirical study in subsequent 
chapters. Its main features include governance, governance type, policy tools and their 
evaluative criteria which have been further discussed at above.  Whilst it has been 
highlighted that these elements should not be construed out of context, it is of paramount 
importance to identify factors including policy areas, governance capacity of the state, 
institutional arrangement and degree of cooperation between public and private sectors 
should the features above are being addressed regarding a public policy. 
In the following chapter, we shall look into the history and development of 
retirement protection system in Hong Kong with due reference to the concept of 
governance, governance type, policy tools, and also take into account of the context in 
which they were/are adopted.  Attempt shall then be made to evaluate its effectiveness, or 
fitness, with suggestion of further improvement if appropriate. 
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Chapter 3 - Retirement Protection Scheme Developments 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided the framework of the governance model and policy tools and 
introduced the World Bank’s Multi-Pillar Model as a reference for retirement protection.  
Inevitably, the Three-Pillar-Model of the World Bank issued in 1994 was an important 
paradigm shift in Hong Kong’s retirement protection. 
Before 1994, Hong Kong already adopted Pillar I and III.  Pillar I is comprised of 
the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) and Old Age Allowance (OAA), 
with an aim to redistribute public resources to provide basic protection to the 
impoverished, whilst Pillar III is the voluntary privately savings of the public at large for 
their own retirement protection.  However, right after the introduction of the World 
Bank’s model, the Hong Kong government immediately enacted the Mandatory 
Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance (MPFSO) in 1995 and launched the Mandatory 
Provident Fund (MPF) Schemes in 2000 to set up a mandatory private saving programme 
for the working population to fill up the empty space of Pillar II. 
Before further discussing on the governance and policy tools of the MPF System, 
the evolution of the retirement protection system in Hong Kong should first be evaluated.  
Three major timeframes are identified that outline the history and development of 
retirement protection in Hong Kong.  In parallel, Knill and Tosun’s governance model 
will be applied and what policy tools were implemented in the phases will also be 
reviewed. 
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Phase I: Before 1965 – A Hands-Off Private Self-Governance Approach, as the 
Existing Pillar III 
Before 1965, old age retirement was solely relied on voluntary contribution as the 
Hong Kong government did not provide any social support and retirement protection to 
the public.  Two main reasons are identified for the phenomenon.  First, in traditional 
Chinese culture, the belief that families should take care of their elderly and relatives 
instead of relying on the support of the government strongly embedded in the society.  
The colonial government was eager to see the rolling of the traditional culture and saw no 
point to provide any instant assistance to the elderly.  Second, with limited financial 
resources, the government worried that any active participation in retirement protection 
would incur serious financial burden on the government and hesitated to take action.  
Meanwhile, the non-government/non-profit organisations (NGOs/NPOs) were weak and 
not well established.  They were not able to put any pressure on the government or make 
contributions to fight for the benefits of the needed.  The public had no choice but rely on 
their private savings to deal with retirement needs.   
Neither the government nor the public sector had a leading role in the retirement 
policy.  On the other hand, the public at large had a relatively high autonomy and 
flexibility to plan and prepare their retirement protection.  The planning and preparation 
of the retirement of the public would be determine their own retirement lives.  
Furthermore, no general support or assistance would be provided by the government and 
NGOs/NPOs.  In this context, with low legal binding duty of the government and a low 
cooperation between the private and public sectors, it is fair to conclude that the 
government assumed a Private Self-Governance in this policy area. 
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Under the Private Self-Governance, the government also adopted a hands-off 
strategy in this policy area.  No specific tools or regulations were taken and the financial 
responsibility of retirement protection laid solely on the shoulder of citizens.  Rather than 
concluding the government implemented the Pillar III – the voluntary pillar, it would be 
more appropriate to define the Pillar III as a by-product under the Private-Self 
Governance. 
Phase II: Between 1965 – 1987 - A Hands-On and a More Interventionist 
Governance Approach as the Birth of Pillar I 
Although the colonial government aimed to minimise its role in poverty 
protection before 1965, it realised that the absence of social safety net might incur a 
higher social cost to the govern.  Thus, the government started to evaluate the social 
welfare policy in 1965. 
Gertude Williams, a consultant, was employed by the government to evaluate 
social welfare policy in Hong Kong.  Williams’ findings reflected that rather than relying 
on the private sectors, there was an urge for the government to set up a more structural 
social protection system.  Shortly after the findings, the government embarked on a 
feasibility study on establishing the Central Provident Fund (CPF) in 1966 and further 
formed a Task Force in 1967 for the setting up of a better social safety net.  The Task 
Force affirmed that the government should take a leading role in retirement protection 
and considered the CPF as the way out for the retirement protection.  However, the 
government at the time worried about the sustainability of the CPF, in particularly after 
the riots in 1967.  The CPF was discarded but the government still took a more proactive 
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role to devise different means to deal with the problem of poverty and an ageing 
population. 
Public Assistance/CSSA 
To deal with the problem of poverty, the government launched the Public 
Assistance in 1971, the predecessor of the CSSA, to provide a financial subsidy as a basic 
support to those in financial need. 
The CSSA Scheme is an economic tool designed to serve as a safety net to those 
who cannot support themselves financially due to old age, unemployment, low-income, 
disability, illnesses, etc.  Under the scheme, each family is a unit and applications are 
household based.  Successful households would pass both asset and income test, i.e., they 
do not have sufficient household income to meet their monthly expenses (LWB, FSTB & 
CPU, 2011). 
An elderly person may also apply for the CSSA but has to submit a declaration to 
the Social Welfare Department (SWD) about his/her financial position that he/she does 
not receive any financial resources or have any linkages with family members (LWB, 
FSTB & CPU, 2011).  In recognising their needs during retirement whilst they have no 
ability to make a living, the average CSSA payment and asset limit for aged recipients are 
set at a higher rate than those for general recipients. 
OAA 
On top of the CSSA, the government further introduced the OAA to enhance 
elderly protection in 1973. 
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There are two kinds of OAA in Hong Kong, namely the Normal Old Age 
Allowance (NOAA) and Old Age Living Allowance (OALA), and both are non-
contributory.  NOAA is a means-tested scheme, whereas OALA is non-means-tested 
scheme.  Elderly citizens aged above 70 and 65 are eligible for NOAA and OALA 
respectively, whereas both NOAA and OALA are given at a flat rate to eligible 
applicants. 
The significance of the CSSA and OAA  
In the period between 1966 and 1987, the introduction of the CSSA and OAA was 
a milestone for Pillar I.  The government delivered the basic social safety net to the 
public through a mandatory tax-financed public contribution.   Citizens who pass the 
means test set by the government (i.e. SWD) will be eligible for CSSA or OAA.  Pillar I 
was then established through the redistribution of tax revenue. 
The censorship system in CSSA and OAA reflects that the government took the 
hands-on approach in the running and monitoring of the redistribution of tax revenue.  
The more pivotal role of the government in the safety net indicates the mode of 
governance shifted away from Private-Self approach and moved towards the 
Interventionist Governance.  However, contribution from the public sector was still 
limited in this policy.  Public sector organisations such as the Hong Kong Federation of 
Trade Unions and religious bodies made some retirement protection suggestions, but they 
were not crucial to the government which still had the ultimate authority in the policy 
area. 
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The strong decision-making power of the government compared to the low level 
of cooperation with public sectors showed that the government adopted the 
Interventionist Governance with the principle of “small government and large market”, 
the government continually refused to contribute a larger sum of public fund and 
hesitated to set up a CPF to tackle the ageing problem.  In the absence of any legal 
binding retirement protections such as CPF or MPF, the mode of governance should be 
somewhere between Private-Self Governance and Interventionist Governance.  
Several policy tools were applied in the operation of Pillar I.  The government 
used SWD as the regulatory body for the administration of CSSA and OAA, such as 
censorship of applications, monitoring of issues of funds and on-going evaluation of the 
system.  On the other hand, CSSA and OAA themselves were used as the economic tools 
to deliver monetary allowances to the vulnerable people under SWD’s administration 
umbrella.  Under this mode of governance, the policy tools were effective for the 
operation of Pillar I. 
Phase III: Between 1987 and 2000 - Hands-On and Off Regulated-Self Governance 
Approach as the Forming of Pillar II 
The longstanding struggle for the development of Pillar II 
Although the government moved a step forward from the hands-off approach to a 
more proactive role in providing financial subsistence to the needy, the call for a better 
retirement protection plan never stopped.  Nevertheless, the debate for the universal 
retirement protection was still controversial in the society and the diverging views on the 
retirement plan made nothing more than discussion over the years. 
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In 1987, some retirement plans including the CPF had been submitted to the 
Legislative Council (LegCo) for extensive discussion (Official Records of Proceedings of 
the Legislative Council, 1987), but neither the government nor LegCo favoured the CPF 
for several reasons.  First, the enormous monetary capital under centralised control for 
investment purposes would seriously affect the financial, monetary and foreign exchange 
markets.  Second, the scheme would impose additional costs to employers but could not 
provide sufficient protection for the retired (HKSAR Government, 1992).  Third, the 
social welfare development of Hong Kong saw both external and internal constraints at 
the time.  Externally, Hong Kong had to achieve a balanced budget and maintain fiscal 
reserves for any unforeseeable challenges; whereas internally, the colonial administrators 
of the government aimed to maintain low taxation (Chan, 1998). 
After four years in the first attempt to modify the retirement plan, another motion 
was submitted to LegCo urging the government to “take immediate steps to re-examine 
the setting up of a CPF or other forms of compulsory retirement schemes in order that 
workers in Hong Kong are provided with comprehensive retirement protection”.  Again, 
the motion was voted down without the consensus amongst LegCo members and citizens 
(Official Records of Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 1991). 
Interim version - Occupational Retirement Schemes Ordinance 
After the longstanding development, the public sectors (NGOs and NPOs) began 
to have much higher political influence and had the ability to contribute in the retirement 
policy area.  Their persistent urge for a better retirement plan gave substantial pressure to 
the government. The Occupational Retirement Schemes Ordinance (ORSO) was 
introduced to address the public sentiment.  It was enacted in late 1992 and came into 
40 
 
operation in 1993. 
The ORSO is a voluntary scheme participated by the employers whom provide 
retirement benefits to their employees.  Terms of the scheme such as the coverage, 
enrolment arrangement and contribution rate are determined by individual employer.  The 
contribution rate is mainly based on basic income and there is no compensation fund to 
protect the funds.  The ORSO does not outline details of the ORSO schemes. Joining the 
scheme is a sole voluntary commitment and this could be considered as a quasi-legal 
regulation devised by the government before the establishment of the MPF System 
(MPFA, 2015).  There was no formal requirement for employers to establish or join any 
retirement schemes before the MPF System appeared.  To cope with the launch of the 
MPF System, employers with ORSO schemes can be exempted from joining the MPF 
System given that certain conditions are fulfilled (MPFA,2015).  The setting of the 
ORSO was a more moderate and less controversial policy that acted as a test of the public 
acceptance of voluntary contribution by the employers before actually moving towards 
the MPF or CPF.  The result of the ORSO was promising and gave confidence to the 
government for implementing some mandatory voluntary contributions. 
The situation before MPFSO 
The implementation of the ORSO would not end the desire for better retirement 
plans, the government thus formed an inter-departmental working group on this aspect.  
The objective of the group was to review options other than the CPF that would enable 
workers to have a better retirement protection.  In October 1992, the working group 
issued a consultation paper, ‘A Community-wide Retirement Protection System’, 
proposing for the introduction of a privately-managed mandatory contributory retirement 
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scheme – a retirement protection system – for all full-time employees under the age of 65.  
However, the proposal was turned down by citizens in public consultations. 
In December 1993, the government proposed to LegCo an Old Age Pension 
Scheme (OPS) for discussion.  OPS would provide a flat-rate monthly pension for all 
eligible elderly aged 65 or above.  All eligible residents would receive a monthly pension 
equivalent to approximately 30% of the median wage, i.e. HK$2,300 at the price levels of 
1994.  The government planned to make a capital injection of HK$10 billion as a start-up 
fund to finance the scheme and enable an immediate payment of pension to eligible 
persons.  The amount of benefits would be indexed annually to the Composite Consumer 
Price Index and it was to be funded by a compulsory contribution i.e., 3% of an 
employee’s income to be shared equally between the employers and employees in a long-
term basis.  The consultation paper of OPS was launched in July 1994 for comments.  
Again, the OPS was discarded in January 1995 as the public opinions diverged and were 
not supportive. 
The catalyst for the launch of MPFSO 
The development of the retirement policy was stuck due to the diverging public 
opinions and the balance of needs of various parties also made this policy complicated.  
Having said so, the introduction of Three-Pillar-Model by the World Bank in 1994 was 
the catalyst for the birth of the MPF System. 
In 1994, Hong Kong only covered Pillar I and III but not Pillar II.  With reference 
to the World Bank’s model, the government decided to fulfil the remaining Pillar II.  
Whilst the submissions on OPS were of divided opinions, the public consultation 
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indicated that there would be greater public acceptance of a mandatory, privately-
managed provident fund scheme, particularly if it could be set up by 1997.  The lobbying 
works with LegCo members, trade union leaders and representatives of business 
community also showed that the introduction of MPF would be regarded as a pragmatic 
way forward to help the retired citizens.  In this juncture, the government expeditiously 
proposed another motion in March 1995 to introduce a mandatory, privately managed 
occupational retirement protection system with provision for the preservation and 
portability of benefits.  Finally, the LegCo voted 28-21 in support of the government's 
motion to introduce a mandatory, privately-managed occupational retirement. 
The MPFSO (Cap. 485) was subsequently submitted to and passed by LegCo in 
July 1995.  The MPFSO provided the framework for the establishment of the non-
governmental mandatory MPF System for the purpose of funding benefits for retirement.  
It was amended in March 1998 and supplemented by subsidiary legislation enacted in 
April 1998 and May 1999 respectively, which set out the detailed rules governing the 
operation of the MPF System (Legislative Council Secretariat FS18/04-05).  Under the 
MPFSO, the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority (MPFA) was formed as the 
statutory body to establish, monitor and evaluate the development of MPF.  After the 
longstanding struggle and fierce debates, the MPF Schemes were finally launched for the 
working population in December 2000. 
The significance of the developments of ORSO and MPFSO 
The period between 1987 and 2000 should be concluded as a watershed for the 
development of retirement protection plan in Hong Kong.  Under the persistent desire for 
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a better retirement plan by the public and private sectors, the government took a more 
pivotal role in old age protection.  The enactment of ORSO was the first indicator 
showing the eagerness of the government in addressing the public needs via legislation.  
The plan to inject a large sum of monetary contribution (i.e. HKD 10 billion) as start-up 
capital for the OPS also reflected the aspiration of the government in the retirement 
policy.  Although the OPS was rejected in LegCo, the government immediately submitted 
another proposal i.e. the MPFSO as an alternative for retirement protection.  The 
intension to set up the OPS, the enactment of the ORSO and the MPFSO revealed that the 
government had finally taken up the legal responsibilities in the retirement plan.  
Meanwhile, the increasing bargaining power of the public sector also urged the 
government to use the MPFA as a statutory body, not only to monitor and evaluate the 
MPF System, but also to closely cooperate with stakeholders such as fund houses, trade 
unions, scholars, etc.  With the high degree of legal binding capacity and a much closer 
cooperation with the public and private sectors via MPFA, the mode of governance 
moved towards the Regulated-Self approach. 
Under this mode of governance, some other policy tools were applied.  The 
enactment of ORSO and MPFSO was the legal tool for the government to invoke legal 
apparatus for the purpose of applying or not applying other resources (or tools) through a 
legitimated authority.  In parallel, the MPFA, as a statutory body, was empowered under 
the ordinance to monitor, control and evaluate the running of MPF System.  The 
mandatory contributions by the employers and employees were on the other hand the 
economic tool for the retirement plan.  As such, Pillar II, a mandatory funded private 
pillar, was finally developed. 
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Concluding Comments 
Contemplating on the development of the retirement plan in Hong Kong up to 
2000, it is noted that the mode of governance had been changing throughout the decades 
and different policy tools were applied with reference to the Pillar model and mode of 
governance. 
Before 1965, under the traditional Chinese culture, the public did not expect the 
government to provide any retirement protection and social safety net. Thus, the 
government adopted the Private-self Governance and Hands-off approach to deal with the 
retirement policy with no particular policy tool required.  Autonomy was given to the 
public so that they could prepare for their own retirement plan.  Pillar III – the voluntary 
pillar was seen in operation. 
Between 1966 and 1987, the government realised the necessity of setting up the 
social safety net and initiated the Public Assistance and OAA for the public in 1971 and 
1973 respectively.  Since then, the government shifted more towards the Interventionist 
Governance by taking more responsibility in the social safety net.  To launch the social 
safety net, the government assigned SWD as the gatekeeper for the censorship, 
monitoring and running of CSSA and OAA.  CSSA and OAA, on the other hand, were 
the economic tools to provide subsidies to the needy.  Pillar I – mandatory tax-financed 
public contribution was in place. 
In the period between 1987 and 2000, different kinds of retirement plans were 
proposed including ORS, MPF and OPS.  Different ordinances were enacted as well.  
This indicated that the government had taken up a more pivotal and legal role in 
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formulating the retirement policy.  The enactment of MPFSO stipulated that the MPFA 
would be the statutory body of the government to monitor the MPF to bring in the 
opinions of the public and private sectors. The mode of governance was identified to be 
moving towards Regulated-Self Governance.  Three policy tools were also identified i.e. 
the legal tool via ORSO and MPFSO; the MPFA as the authorisation; and the mandatory 
private contribution as the economic tool.  After painstaking effort, Pillar II – the 
mandatory private contribution was finally put in place.   
Table 3.1 summarises the development of the retirement plan before 2000 while 
Figure 3.1 shows the movement of the mode of governance during the period. 
 
Table 3.1 - The development of the retirement plan before 2000 
 Before 1965 Bet 1965 and 1987 Bet 1987 and 2000 
Mode of 
governance 
Private-Self  Moving toward 
Interventionist  
Moving toward 
Regulated-Self 
Policy  Nil (only 
autonomy to 
public) 
CSSA and OAA Schemes: ORS; MPF 
Ordinances: ORSO & 
MPFO 
Department/ 
Statutory body 
involved 
Nil Social Welfare 
Department 
Mandatory Fund 
Scheme Authority 
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Policy tools Nil Economic Tool; 
Authorisation Tool 
Economic Tool; 
Legal Tool; 
Authorisation Tool 
Pillar 
development 
Pillar III Pillar I and III Pillar I, II and III 
 
Figures 3.1 - The movement of the mode of governance before 2000 
 
In conclusion, the government always adhered to the principles of small 
government and positive non-interventionism, regarding welfare as a responsibility 
shared between the government and the family (Chow, 1998), but the public have a 
growing sense of their own social rights and the government’s responsibility to provide 
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social welfare.  All these drove the government to enhance the safety net and modify the 
retirement protection.  In this context, the MPF System was finally established as the 
result of intensive policy debates in the past 40 years.  However, the establishment of 
MPF was the start only, Hong Kong citizens, the politicians and the public sectors would 
continuously battle for better plans, such as universal retirement protection.  The next 
chapter will discuss how the governance and tools during the implementation of the MPF 
and how the MPF were adjusted with reference to the public needs and wants. 
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Chapter 4 - The MPF System 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the MPF System after its launch in 
2000.  The discussion of the MPF System will focus on the governance and policy tools 
applied in the MPFSO and the MPFA.  The MPFSO is the basis of the MPF system, and 
the MPFA is the organisation that oversees the system. 
The MPF System – A Core Policy Tool in Regulated-Self Governance 
The MPF System, being the core policy tool in retirement protection policy in 
Hong Kong, consists of the public sector, employees, employers and different types of 
service providers with different roles and responsibilities.  Public and private sectors are 
cooperating together in the policy-making and implementation, but this is not a simple 
expression of network governance involves market and hierarchy.  The institutional 
relationship between public and private sectors is not only characterised by high 
cooperation; but also under a high degree of legal obligation. 
The public policy in the area of retirement protection through the MPF System is 
an expression of a Regulated-Self Governance, in which cooperative relationship 
between public and private actors is accompanied by legally binding rules as stated in the 
MPFSO, Chapter 485, Laws of Hong Kong.  Private sectors are participating under 
clearly formalised and institutionalised procedure. 
Regulated Self-Governance involves market, hierarchy and also the use of 
appropriate policy tools.  The associated legally binding rules and procedures established 
by primary legislation, is a policy tool implemented by the government as a regulatory 
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method.  The government regulates the MPF System by introducing the bill on MPFSO, 
to implement the regulation through a statutory body, the MPFA.  This is a form of legal 
regulation through primary legislation of laws and establishment of a regulatory structure. 
The operation of the MPFA is independent from the government.  MPFA is not a 
government department, this arrangement strengthens the foundation of a minimal state 
and its market mechanism (Chan, 2003).   However, is it the case? 
The MPFSO – The Regulatory Basis 
The MPFSO was enacted in 1995.  It was a bill introduced by the government.  
This ordinance provides a basis for the establishment of the MPF System. This is a 
primary legislation initiated by the government with a function to provide a set of legal 
binding rules for governing all activities related to the MPF System. 
The Ordinance was not enacted without controversy.  It was only introduced after 
a series of discussions and debates in the society as elaborated in the previous chapter.  It 
was only after the introduction of the Three-Pillar-Model by the World Bank in 1994 via 
the Report ‘Averting the Old Age Crisis’, the government proposed the bill on MPFSO 
for LegCo’s consideration. 
The MPFSO is divided into six parts with different areas of focus. The long title 
of the ordinance outlines the objectives as follows (MPFSO, 2013): 
 to provide for contributions to and the registration of MPF schemes; 
 to provide and create a regulatory regime i.e., a MPF Schemes authority to oversee 
the administration and management of MPF schemes; 
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 to exempt certain classes of persons from contributing to the schemes; 
 to provide for the approval of persons as trustees of registered schemes, and to 
control and regulate approved trustees, to regulate the sales and marketing activities; 
and  
 to give advice related to registered schemes. 
The MPFSO is a primary legislation incorporated into the Laws of Hong Kong.  It 
provides comprehensive legal binding rules designed by the government, however, the 
ordinance clearly positions the MPF as a non-governmental scheme for the purpose of 
funding benefits on retirement protection to the workforce.  The MPF System is rather 
based on cooperation between public and private participants with strong legal binding 
i.e., a reflection of Regulated Self-Governance type. 
The MPFA – The Regulatory Body 
Regulatory structure of the MPFA 
The MPFA was established in 1998 pursuant to section 6 of the MPFSO.  The 
MPFA positioned itself as a regulatory structure responsible for regulating and 
supervising the operations of the MPF System so as to ensure the compliance to MPFSO. 
The MPFA is governed by a Management Board, which is assisted by supporting 
committees and receives advices from two statutory advisory committees. Supporting 
committees include both standing and ad hoc committees, which provide on-going 
support and advices on specific issue respectively.  Under the Management Board is the 
Managing Director whom is responsible for overseeing the daily operations of MPFA 
(MPFA, 2015). 
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Reference to the regulatory structure chart in Figure 4.1, under the MPF schemes, 
there are MPF trustees, MPF intermediaries and MPF schemes and products.  The MPFA 
is responsible for approving qualified trustees and intermediaries, regulating their affairs 
and activities; registering provident fund schemes as registered schemes; making rules or 
guidelines for the payment of mandatory contributions and for the administration of 
registered schemes, etc. 
 
Figure 4.1 - Regulatory Structure of the MPFA (MPFA, 2014) 
 
Organisation of the MPFA:  a policy tool to use policy tools 
The MPFA as a statutory body is a policy tool adopted by the government to 
regulate and supervise the MPF schemes. Functions of the MPFA are laid down in 
section 6E(1) of MPFSO.  In the aspect of regulating and supervising, the MPFA is 
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responsible for ensuring compliance with MPFSO; registering provident fund schemes as 
registered schemes; approving qualified persons to be approved trustees of registered 
schemes; and regulating their affairs and activities, etc. 
Apart from regulation and supervision, the MPFA takes up the role of educator, 
promoter and facilitator of the MPF schemes.  Under the Managing Director, the MPFA 
is divided into a number of divisions with different functions.  These divisions are 
established to oversee, manage and implement the work of MPFA in the areas of 
enforcement, supervision, regulation and policy, external relations and media, corporate 
services, and risk management. 
A policy tool is capable of assuming multiple roles with various functions or 
actions.  The MPFA as a policy tool itself deploys other tools to address different issues 
of the MPF System.  Regulatory function is the main tool, which is supplemented by 
other tools, which is “softer” in nature, such as education, promotion and facilitation. 
Characteristics of Regulated Self-Governance in the MPFA 
The MPF System is clearly defined as a privately managed retirement scheme and 
not centrally managed by the government.  Under the regulated self-governance mode, 
relationship between private and public sectors is characterised by high cooperation 
without government domination.  It can be found in areas such as financial, operational 
and managerial composition. 
The MPFA as a statutory body is independent from the government, which 
preserves its autonomy over financial and operational affairs.  Upon the set up of MPFA 
in 1998, LegCo approved a capital grants of $5 billion provided for MPFA’s initial set up 
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and $600 million put into the Compensation Fund established under the MPF System.  
Subsequently, the MPFA operates on a self-financing basis, its’ incomes are the fees and 
charges collected and investment returns generated from the initial lump-sum grant 
(MPFA, 2007).  This arrangement has a capacity to enable MPFA to run efficiently in the 
economic term. 
The composition of MPFA’s Management Board reveals high cooperation 
between the public and private sectors. Pursuant to section 6A of the MPFSO, the Chief 
Executive appoints all directors.  In appointing directors, the Chief Executive must ensure 
that the number of persons appointed represent the interests of relevant employees is 
equal to the number of persons appointed to represent the interests of participating 
employers. 
Currently, there are 11 non-executive directors and 5 executive directors in the 
Management Board.  The present chairman of the Management Board is Dr David Wong, 
who is also a managing director of an investment limited company.  He was appointed in 
March 2015 as the successor of Anna Wu, ex-chairman of the Board, who was a member 
of the Executive Council of the Hong Kong government with extensive record of public 
records.  The rest of the 10 non-executive directors include 2 Permanent Secretaries from 
the government, 2 legal professionals, 3 Legislative Councillors, 2 finance/investment 
professionals and 1 being the General Secretary of the Hong Kong Federation of Trade 
Unions. 
Although the MPF Scheme is a privately managed scheme, as a public policy on 
retirement protection, the government contributes to the board by having 2 seats i.e., the 
alternate Permanent Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury and the Permanent 
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Secretary for Labour and Welfare.  The composition is clearly designed and endorsed by 
the government so as to ensure balance of powers among stakeholders of the MPF 
System from both public and private sectors. 
The MPF system is regulated by the MPFSO.  It requires strict compliance of 
rules and regulations.  However, detail operations including direction and focus of the 
MPFA are not outlined in the legislation.  Directors from different backgrounds, through 
participation in the board, the sole governing body of the MPFA, will be able to influence 
each other via liaison and communication.  The composition of the board facilitates 
flexible cooperation between public and private sectors, and also reflects the nature of the 
MPF system at the same time. 
Code on Disclosure for MPF Investment Funds 
Under the MPFSO, the MPFA is empowered to issue guidelines for approved 
trustees, service providers and other persons concerned with the MPFSO.  Apart from the 
legislation, the Code on Disclosure for MPF Investment Funds (the Code) was first 
published in June 2004, i.e. 3.5 years after the launch of the MPF System, to improve 
transparency of the scheme in particular the degree of disclosure of information on fees, 
charges and performance of MPF funds.  It gives guidance on top of the MPFSO to 
approved trustees and other service providers about the disclosure of information about 
MPF schemes and constituent funds, particularly in information about fees, charges and 
performance; sets out guidance about content for a range of documents such as offering 
documents, fund fact sheets and annual benefit statements as supplement to the MPFSO 
and other existing code and regulation (MPFA, 2012).  This Code enjoys the same status 
as a guideline issued under the MPFSO which has also set out the consequence of the 
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contravention of a guideline, whilst compliance with a guideline issued by the MPFA is 
also stated as a standard condition that a trustee and registration of a scheme have to 
complied with before approval is granted to them to be listed under the MPF market. 
During the course of the operation of MPF scheme, information is provided to a 
range of parties for different purposes.  Obviously, scheme members and prospective 
scheme members need information for a variety of purposes: firstly, to understand the 
nature, characteristics and rights pertaining to the scheme; secondly, to enable them to 
make informed investment decisions about the range of choices available to them; thirdly, 
to verify transactional information such as contributions and redemptions; and fourthly, 
to assist them in longer term financial planning for retirement and lifestyle needs.  In 
order to facilitate decision-making, members need to be provided with information on a 
continuous basis.  The Code has therefore set out some guidelines governing the manner 
and extent with respect to the disclosure of information which should facilitate decision 
making, promote comparability whilst the information provided should be consistent, 
clear, concise and timely (MPFA, 2012).  Under these directives, samples and templates 
of information and its scope to be provided were designed to ensure compliance.  For 
instance, a ‘Fee Table’ has been recommended which cover all fees and charges under 
the scheme; what a particular fee is for; the amount of each fee currently charged; and 
from whom each fee is payable (MPFA, 2012). 
In addition to the obvious needs of scheme members (i.e. citizens), other 
stakeholders such as employers, industry peers, academics, regulators, the government 
and the media will have an interest in information about the registered schemes.  The 
focus of the guidance contained in the Code is not solely on the provision of information 
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to citizens who have/or will be registered under MPF schemes; whilst the needs of other 
stakeholders, particularly employers, have also been giving more comprehensive 
information about fees and charges which will be of good assistance to them in choosing 
a scheme for their employees since fees and charges are some of the key relevant factors 
in making that decision. 
Since the launch of MPF in December 2000, the MPFA has been working with 
the industry under the ideal of regulated self-governance.  The Code is a good example of 
public-private collaboration initiated by the MPFA and the industry is supportive of the 
project and has contributed significantly to the development of it.  It has not only 
enhanced the transparency of fee, charges and performance on MPF funds by means of a 
legal regulation under the Code, it has also played its role as an informational regulation 
tool which seeks to provide scheme members with clearer and information that is easier-
to-understand so as to enable them to make a better informed investment decision for 
their retirement protection through the MPF.  Interestingly, it is also recognised that some 
disclosure material has both served the purpose of providing information to scheme 
members to help them make decisions and also the commercial purpose of promoting 
MPF products, contributing to a win-win scenario between the citizens who have to 
invest in MPF and the private sectors participating in the scheme and selling the product. 
Under the Code, some requirements in the form of informational tools include the 
use of mechanisms such as simplified language, improving the consistency of 
presentation and language, and a variety of tools that will assist members in better 
understanding the MPF information such as a fee table for all registered MPF schemes, 
an on-going cost illustration that shows the cost over a period of investment time, and 
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fund expense ratios which show the total level of expenses incurred by a fund (MPFA, 
2012). 
Compliance Standards for MPF Approved Trustees 
With a view to ensuring the smooth operation of the MPF System, enhancing the 
monitoring role of the authority, hence promoting good corporate governance and proper 
risk management as well as a strong compliance culture among the MPF approved 
trustees (Trustees), MPFA issued a set of Compliance Standards (the Standards) in July 
2005 for the guidance of Trustees specifically to assist them in developing a structured 
framework for monitoring their compliance with the statutory duties and responsibilities 
(MPFA, 2005). 
The Standards outlines different sets of compliance programme to help the 
organisation (i.e. Trustees) address statutory obligations; develop and maintain policies 
that drives the organisation towards a positive compliance culture and encourages 
compliance practices; allocate resources to monitor an organisation’s compliance and to 
ensure that compliance reporting is timely, accurate and complete; ensure that staff 
understand their respective roles in meeting the trustee’s statutory obligations with 
capacity building through training and communication; enable proactive and timely 
management of complaints received from scheme members and participating employers; 
evaluate its compliance with these programmes and conduct regular review; and establish 
reporting mechanisms to the board of directors of the organisation (MPFA, 2005). 
Precisely, the Standards form a compliance standards framework.  They describe 
the purpose of a compliance programme and elements that approved trustees may put in 
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place to help ensure compliance level with the legal requirement under the MPFSO.  
These elements aim at ensuring that there is a solid foundation in the organisation for the 
development of specific measures (or compliance plans) to address key obligations.  
Implementation of these elements will help assist an approved trustee to develop a 
positive compliance culture and as a result ensure the effectiveness of its compliance 
programme as required by the legal regulation. 
By outlining compliance plan and elements for trustees so as to ensure their 
compliance level with the statutory requirement, the Standards serve as structural 
regulations which are utilised to manipulate the physical environment of the organisation 
to influence its action.  It depicts some compliance plans which are the key tools within a 
compliance programme to achieve compliance with respect to obligations.  It is under this 
intangible power that the MPFA intends to influence the trustees so that the latter could 
formulate plans and measures to meet identified obligations, monitoring, supervision 
these measures as well as reporting of the compliance level as and when necessary, under 
the umbrella of the regulated self-governance. 
Comparative Platform: Fees and Trustee Service 
Fee comparative platform 
Followed by the Code on Disclosure for MPF Investment Funds which was 
launched in 2004, the MPFA introduced the Comparative Platform as another 
informational tool to improve the transparency of information about MPF funds.  
Operated on its website since July 2007, the Comparative Platform of MPF funds 
provides scheme members with information about fees and charges measured by the 
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average/highest/lowest fund expense ratio of the six main types of MPF funds namely 
Capital Preservation Fund, Guaranteed Fund, Bond Fund, Mixed Assets Fund, Equity 
Fund and others, thus enabling comparison of fees and charges across different types of 
MPF funds at an one-stop online platform (MPFA, 2007). 
Given its comparative features, the platform could also serve the purpose as an 
educational tool to facilitate scheme members to better understand fees and charges of 
MPF funds and to compare across the funds, with reference to the MPF Investment 
Education Campaign conducted since 2005 whilst the aim of which is to enhance scheme 
members' knowledge of MPF investments and understanding on the information made 
available under the Disclosure Code, such as fee table and fund fact sheet etc. 
Trustee service comparative platform 
Back in September 2012, there were about 40 MPF schemes provided by over a 
dozen MPF trustees in the market.  Since the services offered by the different trustees and 
the fund choices available were never identical, it was not easy for citizens to understand 
the details when they were trying to choose in the basket the most suitable scheme for 
themselves. 
As a quick solution, the “Trustee Service Comparative Platform” was launched by 
the MPFA, and served as a helping tool for citizens by providing details of the services 
offered in different schemes of each trustee specifically in the following three areas 
(MPFA, 2012): 
 Fund Choices - types of funds and number of each type of fund available for 
selection; 
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 Account Administration - the time required to process benefits transfer, 
withdrawal and contribution settlement, and the channels available and time 
required to change investment allocation. 
 Customer Services - for example, how often Member Benefit Statements and Fund 
Fact Sheets are sent to members, enquiry channels, details of online services and 
interactive voice response systems. 
As a service provider and facilitator with a shift of the responsibility to the citizen in 
planning for their retirement protection, the comparative platforms introduced by MPFA 
allow scheme members to compare service fee and services offered under all available 
schemes, a few selected trustees or schemes, or simply focus on a particular scheme.  
These platforms are also helpful to scheme members planning to switch trustees and 
schemes after the implementation of the Employee Choice Arrangement, or if they want 
to review the services of the current scheme and trustee of their personal accounts.  
Employers and self-employed persons can also refer to the information on this platform 
when selecting the trustees and schemes for their employees or themselves, with greater 
degree of information and hence autonomy provided under the regulated self-governance 
model coupled with the use of informational tools. 
General Performance of the MPF System 
It is noted that MPF does contribute to the retirement protection in Hong Kong to 
a certain extent.  In respect of retirement protection coverage, the percentage of 
workforce with retirement protection has increased from around 33% before the MPF’s 
introduction to around 85% in December 2014.  From being protected by nothing to 
being protected by the MPF, it is indeed a significant improvement on retirement 
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protection for the 52% of the workforce.  In respect of asset capacity, the total assets of 
the MPF as at the end of March 2015 is almost $600 billion.  Such considerable amount 
would greatly relieve the financial burden of the government on retirement protection.  In 
respect of return level, the annualised rate of return (net of fees and charges) of MPF is 
4.2% for the period from December 2000 to October 2014.  As compared with the 
annualised inflation rate at 1.8% and the annualised one-month Hong Kong Dollar 
deposit rate at 0.7% over the same period, the return level of the MPF stands out 
obviously (ISD, 2014) (Wong, 2015). 
However, the performance of MPF in respect of cost level is not satisfactory.  
According to a study of the administrative costs of MPF conducted by Ernst & Young 
engaged by MPFA, the average Fund Expense Ratio of MPF is 1.74% from July 2010 to 
June 2011, which is the highest among all other comparing countries, such as Chile at 
0.6%, United States at 0.83%, Australia at 1.21% and Mexico at 1.32% (Ernst & Young, 
2012).  In fact, this problem of high cost level of MPF has been continuously raised by 
the Consumer Council, LegCo, as well as MPFA itself.  For the Consumer Council, its 
study in 2007 revealed that a good sizeable proportion of investment is deducted by MPF 
service providers over a host of fees and charges (a 1% annual fee will reduce 23% of 
retirement benefits or $690,000 less for an accrued balance of $3.05 million, over 40 
years on assumption of a 5% investment return) with a wide range of variations in Fund 
Expense Ratio (ranging from the lowest of 0.41% to the highest of 3.87% for all funds, or 
ranging from the lowest of 1.38% to the highest of 2.84% for the same fund type which is 
balanced fund, a major portion of the MPF investment) (Consumer Council, 2007), and 
its study in 2008 further called for greater reduction of MPF fund management fees 
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(Consumer Council, 2008).  For LegCo, there was a motion debate on January 10, 2013, 
criticising on the MPF’s high fees, and urging for a comprehensive review of the MPF 
including the setting a ceiling for the Fund Expense Ratio.  For the MPFA itself, Dr 
David Wong, Chairman of MPFA admitted in his speech on “MPF - 15 Years and 
Beyond” at the luncheon of Hong Kong Retirement Schemes Association on May 14, 
2015, that “the fees charged by funds are often the target of the most vehement attacks” 
(Wong, 2015).  In short, it is a must for MPFA to explore some new policy tools as cost 
drivers. 
Recent Refinements of the MPF System 
Employee choice arrangement (ECA): a new policy tool - from regulated self-
governance towards private self-governance 
As mentioned above, it is a must for MPF to explore some new policy tools as 
cost drivers.  One of these new policy tools is ECA, which not only helps reduce the cost 
level of MPF, but also shows an evolution from Regulated Self-Governance moving 
towards Private Self-Governance, as well as shifts the focus from employers to 
employees. 
The MPFA introduced the ECA on November 1, 2012, to allow semi portability.  
Under ECA, employees can, once a year, opt to transfer the accrued benefits derived 
from the employee mandatory contributions in their contribution accounts to a scheme of 
their own choice.  Alternatively, they do not have to make any changes and retain the 
accrued benefits in the original scheme selected by their employers.  As compared with 
the situation before the introduction of ECA that employees can only choose among the 
schemes selected by their employers, ECA allows employees much greater autonomy in 
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the MPF market (MPFA, 2015). 
By giving employees greater autonomy in the MPF market, ECA enhances market 
competition and thus reduces the cost level of MPF.  This common economic viewpoint 
is proved by real statistics.  Jointly with other measures such as urging trustees to 
introduce low-fee funds and launching a low-fee fund list, ECA helps decrease the 
average Fund Expense Ratio of MPF from 1.74% for the period from July 2010 to June 
2011 (before ECA) to 1.62% as at the end of April 2015 (after ECA).  Therefore, ECA 
does serve as a cost driver for MPF. 
Besides serving as a cost driver, ECA also illustrates an evolution from Regulated 
Self-Governance moving towards Private Self-Governance.  For any single policy, there 
is a mixture of policy tools under a mixture of types of governance, and every policy tool 
would strengthen or show an evolution moving towards certain type of governance.  ECA 
is an economic tool under Freiberg’s classification of policy tools.  This policy tool 
enhances market competition and facilitates free market and free trade, thus shows an 
evolution from Regulated Self-Governance moving towards Private Self-Governance 
under Knill and Lehmkuhl’s four types of governance. 
Furthermore, ECA also shows an evolution of focus from employers to employees.  
As admitted by Anna Wu, the ex-Chairman of MPFA in her speech on March 13, 2015, 
on MPF reform proposals in recent years and her personal perspective on the concepts 
guiding these proposals and where they may lead, that to get the MPF started quickly 15 
years ago, the initial design of MPF gave employers the choice of schemes and trustees 
thus reduced the focus on employees, and MPFA wanted the focus shifted to employees 
thus they introduced ECA (Wu, 2015).  This shift of focus is considered rectifying to the 
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right direction for such a scheme established for protecting the retirement living of 
employees. 
Default investment strategy (DIS): a new policy tool -- from regulated self-governance 
towards interventionist governance 
Notwithstanding the recent decrease in cost level thanks to various measures 
particularly the ECA, the MPFA believes that the Fund Expense Ratio “can and should 
go down further”, as expressed by Dr David Wong, Chairman of MPFA in his speech on 
“MPF - 15 Years and Beyond” at the luncheon of Hong Kong Retirement Schemes 
Association on May 14, 2015 (Wong, 2015).  The main force to make the Fund Expense 
Ratio to go down further will be the DIS, thus Dr David Wong further expressed that his 
“first and foremost” work priority for the next two years is “to see DIS launched by the 
end of 2016”.  Why does DIS rank in such the highest priority in the Chairman’s work 
schedule? 
Before knowing the reason why DIS ranks in such the highest priority in the 
Chairman’s work schedule, we shall first know what DIS is about.  DIS is a default core 
fund with its management fees capped at 0.75% through legislation and its investment 
approach best designed to manage the long-term risks associated with investing 
retirement savings.  It is designed to allow the employees who do not make a fund choice 
to automatically default into the core fund.  It will also provide for automatic de-risking 
over time and allow members to opt out as well as opt in.  The MPFA is expediting the 
launching procedures of DIS.  It published a consultation paper on "Providing Better 
Investment Solutions for MPF Members" in June 2014 and launched a three-month 
consultation to seek views from the public and the industry on the details of the core fund 
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proposal.  The consultation Concluding Comments were released in March 2015.  The 
MPFA would brief the LegCo on the consultation results and the way forward in July 
2015.  Subject to the progress of the legislative processes and the preparation work, it is 
anticipated to introduce the relevant Bill into the LegCo in the 2015-2016 session and to 
implement the DIS by the end of 2016 (LegCo, 2015). 
The DIS does not only mean an extra fund with low fee.  By imposing a fee cap (a 
price ceiling) which will serve as a benchmark for all other MPF funds in the market, DIS 
will also bring down the cost level of all these funds.  Clearly it will become an important 
cost driver for MPF.  Moreover, besides serving as a cost driver, DIS also tackles 
employees’ concern of making difficult MPF choice.  In the workforce market, while 
there are employees who like to or know how to make MPF choice, there are also 
employees who do not like to or do not know how to make MPF choice.  Interestingly, 
the ECA is targeted at the former, while the DIS is targeted at the latter.  Given that there 
are so many different funds in the MPF market, and some of the funds are complicated 
with volatile return, the DIS is targeted at delivering a more consistent performance and 
offering a more simplified choice for those employees who do not like to or do not know 
how to make the choice. 
Similar to ECA, DIS is also a policy tool showing an evolution moving towards 
certain type of governance.  DIS is an economic tool using price regulation under 
Freiberg’s classification of policy tools.  This policy tool interferes with private market 
price setting.  Such intervention shows an evolution from Regulated Self-Governance 
moving towards Interventionist Governance under Knill and Lehmkuhl’s four types of 
governance. 
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Amendments to the MPFSO 
The Regulated-Self Governance of the MPF System is based on the legally 
binding rules set in the MPFSO.  Since the MPFSO’s enactment in 1995, it has gone 
through some changes. Below is the list of amendments made to the MPFSO from launch 
to 2015 (MPFA Milestones, 2015). 
When the government first introduced the MPFSO, it only had a broad framework 
of the yet to be established MPF System.  The first amendment to the MPFSO was made 
in 1998 on the principal Ordinance for the effective operation and enforcement of the 
MPF System; and MPF subsidiary legislation to map out details on MPF schemes 
membership, registration, operational and exemption matters.  The MPF System would 
not launch until 2000. 
Two years after the MPF System was in operation, the government introduced 
new amendments to the MPFSO.  The first and second Mandatory Provident Fund 
Schemes (Amendment) Ordinance 2002 were enacted in February and July of that year 
respectively to improve the administrative and operational aspects of the MPF legislation 
and enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the MPF System. 
In January and June 2008, the government enacted that year’s first and second 
Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes (Amendment) Ordinance to improve MPF scheme 
administration and to enhance enforcement against non-compliant employers.  The third 
amendment was then made in July to provide a legal framework for MPFA to implement 
the Government’s injection of contributions into the accounts of eligible MPF and 
Occupational Retirement Schemes Ordinance scheme members. 
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In 2009, the government amended the MPFSO to provide for the Employee 
Choice Arrangement, and in 2011 the MPFSO was amended to protect MPF accrued 
benefits in a registered scheme upon bankruptcy of scheme members. 
In June 2012, the government amended the MPFSO to provide for a statutory 
regime for regulating MPF intermediaries, and it came into operation in November along 
with the launch of the ECA. 
In January 2015, the MPFSO was amended to increase flexibility of withdrawing 
MPF accrued benefits and to facilitate streamlining of the administrative procedures of 
MPF schemes and enable more effective enforcement actions to protect scheme 
members’ interests. 
In addition to the MPFSO, amendments to the Mandatory Provident Fund 
Schemes (General) Regulation were also made in 2006 and 2012 respectively to improve 
MPF investment rules and to put in place an automatic levy triggering mechanism for the 
Compensation Fund. 
In the two decades of the MPFSO’s enactment, it has been amended every few 
years (11 times in total) to adapt to changes in society and improve the MPF system.  As 
the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau replied to a Legislative Councillor’s 
question in 2014 indicated, “the Government and the MPFA have been reviewing 
arrangements in various areas under the MPF System with a view to identifying 
improvement measures, in the light of experience gained from actual operation and 
opinions from various stakeholders.”  The MPFSO will continue to change in the future. 
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The proposed change to the MPF System in 2015 was the adjustment mechanism 
for the minimum and maximum levels of relevant income for the MPF mandatory 
contributions. 
The MPFSO has already set out that the MPFA must conduct a review of the 
minimum and maximum relevant income levels to determine whether there are grounds 
for adjusting the MPF minimum and maximum mandatory contribution not less than once 
every four years.  The purpose of setting the minimum and maximum relevant income 
levels is to relieve the financial burden of lower income earners and to give higher 
income earners more flexibility on the use of their own money.  The minimum and 
maximum relevant income levels must be adjusted from time to time to reflect the 
changes of income distribution in the workforce. 
At present, the adjustment mechanism is a mixture of automatic and discretionary 
mechanism, and the MPFA would like to change the adjustment mechanism to fully-
automatic, but this requires consensus in society in order to amend the MPFSO.  The 
MPFA conducted a public consultation from January to March 2015 to change the 
adjustment mechanism to determine the minimum and maximum relevant income levels 
at the same time once every two years instead of doing it at least once every four years at 
an unfixed time. 
A majority of the response received in the public consultation is against the 
proposed adjustment mechanism. As a result, MPFA recommended to the Government to 
make no change for the time, and the current rules set in the MPFSO shall stay the same.  
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The Government agrees with the MPFA, and no amendments to the MPFSO will be 
made for the time being. 
Concluding Comments 
This chapter has discussed in details the organisation of the MPFA and the 
regulations of the MPFSO.  The MPF system is based on cooperation between public and 
private participants with strong legal binding, as set out in the MPFSO, and is in 
reflection of regulated self-governance.  Since the MPF’s launch in 2000, the system 
continues to be refined, and the performance of the MPF remains strong. At the same 
time, there is a gradual shift of the MPF system to the direction of private self-
governance in the approach to ECA and interventionist governance in the introduction of 
the DIS. 
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Chapter 5 - Evaluation of the MPF System 
Introduction 
The MPF system is a reflection of Regulated Self-Governance.  It is a policy tool 
deployed to match with the retirement problem in Hong Kong, and it uses various policy 
tools itself.  Is the MPF System the right policy tool?  The appropriateness of the use of 
policy tools and whether it reflects on good governance can be assessed based on several 
evaluative criteria.  Winfield and Rossell suggest four evaluation criteria, i.e. 
effectiveness, economic efficiency, distributional fairness and political acceptability.  In 
this chapter, Winfield and Rossell’s four evaluation criteria for fitness of policy tools will 
be applied to assess the various policy tools of the MPF System.  The chapter will have a 
thorough assessment on whether the MPF System is a fit policy tool to match with the 
retirement problem in Hong Kong. 
Fitness of the Policy Tools of the MPF System 
The MPFSO and MPFA 
The MPFSO was supported and passed by LegCo in 1995 despite the fact that 
there was controversy over the deployment of MPF System as the sole retirement 
protection for the society.  In the political sense, it can be concluded that the MPFSO and 
the relevant MPF System as a retirement protection had general support.  The MPFSO 
outlined the structure, authority, functions, operations of the MPFA System, etc.  
Although the MPFSO did not outline everything relevant to the MPF System, it is 
effective in providing a framework for the MPF System as a primary legislation. 
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MPFA, established pursuant to the MPFSO, is the sole regulatory structure of the 
MPF System.  The MPFA has a mission to regulate and supervise the privately managed 
provident fund schemes; to educate the working population about saving for retirement; 
to promote the role of MPF System as one of the pillars supporting retirement living; and 
to lead improvements to MPF Systems so as to make them more efficient, user-friendly 
and better meet the needs of the working population (MPFA, 2015).  Functionally, the 
MPFA is a carefully structured organisation with many roles.  Regulations and guides are 
comprehensive; however, is MPFA effective in educating the working population about 
saving and leading improvement of the MPF System? 
It is undoubtedly that a majority of the working population knows the existence of 
the MPF System, but do they know the details of their own retirement schemes?  There 
are several amendments to the MPFSO and these amendments affect the operation of the 
MPF System, but do people know about the changes?  Employees often criticised their 
MPF scheme for not generating a satisfactory return, but many of them never took the 
time to study the scheme performance or did not have the knowledge to understand, and 
they simply criticise the system instead.  If the general public were more educated about 
the operation of the MPF System, they would be more able to administer their own 
scheme i.e., to generate more return.  The MPFA may be effective in regulating the MPF 
System, but there is area for improvement in assuming the educator role. 
MPFA as the sole regulatory structure of the MPF System runs itself financially.  
After the one-off capital grant and fund approved by the LegCo for initial set up at a non-
recurrent cost, the MPFA operates on a self-financing basis without seeking extra money. 
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Referencing to the MPFA annual reports since the establishment of the MPFA in 
1998, they recorded surplus or deficit in different years.  The overall capital and reserve 
was above $5 billion i.e., the initial set up grant before 2013.   It is only since 2011; the 
MPFA recorded 4 consecutive years of deficit and the overall capital and reserve first 
recorded below $5 billion i.e., in 2013.  In 2014, it recorded a deficit of $356 million and 
the overall capital and reserve fell to $4.6 billion (MPFA, 2000-2014). 
Consecutive years of deficit suggests that the income is smaller than expenditure 
for several years.  Does the consecutive years of deficit suggest structural deficit? Fees, 
interests from bank deposits and net investments are the main incomes of MPFA, 
whereas, staff costs contribute to the greatest amount of expenditure.   It is worth to note 
that the amount of staff costs increased considerably in the past 20 years.  Income of 
MPFA in 2014 was only one-third to that of 2000, but the expenditure in 2014 increased 
more than 4 times to that of 2000!  Although MPFS operates on a self-financing basis, 
what would happen if the MPFA runs into bankruptcy?  It is still too early to predict 
bankruptcy.  As a whole, it is submitted that MPFA is so far economically efficient as it 
does not seek recurrent funding from the government so far and the cost to the society as 
a whole is rather low. 
Code on disclosure for MPF investment funds 
With the shift towards Regulated Self-Governance, the MPFA has been working 
with the industry on how to better refine the scheme upon the implementation of MPF 
since December 2000.  The Code could be considered as an effective tool which has 
enhanced the transparency of fee, charges and performance on MPF funds by means of a 
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legal regulation under the Code and has also played its role as an informational regulation 
tool which seeks to provide scheme members with clearer and information that is easier 
to understand so as to enable them to make a better informed investment decision for 
their retirement protection through the MPF.  From the distribution of costs and benefits 
perspective, it turns out to be a good example of public-private collaboration initiated by 
the MPFA and the industry is supportive of the project and has contributed significantly 
to the development.  Apart from serving the purpose of providing information to scheme 
members to help them make investment decisions, the disclosure of more materials has 
also achieved the commercial purpose of promoting MPF products, resulting in a win-
win scenario between the citizens who have to invest in MPF and the private sector 
participating in the scheme and selling the product with good degree of economic 
efficiency and hence political acceptability as well. 
Compliance standards for MPF approved trustees 
By drawing up the compliance plan and elements for trustees so as to ensure their 
compliance level with the statutory requirement and thus the smooth operation of the 
MPF System, the Compliance Standards for MPF Approved Trustees serve as structural 
regulations which are utilised to manipulate the physical environment of the organisation 
to influence its action.  It depicts some compliance plans which are the key tools within a 
compliance programme to achieve compliance with respect to obligations.  It is under this 
intangible power that the MPFA intends to influence the trustees, promote good corporate 
governance and proper risk management as well as a strong compliance culture among 
the MPF approved trustees.  Whilst economic efficiency, distribution of costs and 
benefits and political acceptability of this policy tool could be considered as reasonably 
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positive, the effectiveness of the tools will nevertheless depend on the level of 
compliance of the trustees which is subject to individual and self-discipline, leaving 
uncertainty in the overall effectiveness and fitness of this regulatory tool. 
Comparative platform: fees and trustee service 
Following the Code on Disclosure for MPF Investment Funds, the MPFA 
introduced the Comparative Platform as another informational tool to improve the 
transparency of information about MPF funds.  It operates on its website to provide 
scheme members with information about fees and charges at an one-stop online platform.  
Similarly, the “Trustee Service Comparative Platform” launched by the MPFA serves as 
a helping tool for citizens by providing details of the services offered by the different 
schemes in Fund Choices, Account Administration and Customer Services.  Provided that 
the public is made well aware of this tool and educated to use it, there leaves no questions 
to its effectiveness and economic efficiency.  Whilst the MPFA will be responsible for 
the manning of these online platforms, thus minimising the cost of other stakeholders but 
maximising the benefits of both the current and prospective scheme members, there is 
generally a high degree of acceptability to these initiatives which could provide more 
information to the public in order to make a better decision on the purchase of MPF 
products. 
ECA 
As mentioned earlier, ECA, jointly with other measures, helps decrease the 
average Fund Expense Ratio of MPF from 1.74% for the period from July 2010 to June 
2011 (before ECA) to 1.62% as at the end of April 2015 (after ECA).  Moreover, ECA 
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gives employees much greater autonomy in the MPF market to choose the scheme of 
their own choice instead of just choosing among the schemes selected by their employers.  
Therefore, ECA is quite successful and precise in achieving its desired policy outcomes 
on reducing the cost level of MPF and shifting the focus from employers to employees.  
Thus it is considered that ECA is a quite effective policy tool. 
The costs of ECA are just the one-off promulgation cost during the initial 
implementation stage and the recurrent administration cost when the employees, once a 
year, opt to transfer the accrued benefits derived from the employee mandatory 
contributions in their contribution accounts to a scheme of their own choice.  Therefore, it 
is considered that ECA’s costs to society as a whole is low, thus ECA is an economically 
efficient policy tool. 
Before ECA, the distribution of costs and benefits is not fair.  As mentioned 
earlier, Anna Wu, the ex-Chairman of MPFA has admitted that to get the MPF started 
quickly 15 years ago, the initial design of MPF gave employers the choice of schemes 
and trustees thus reduced the focus on employees, and MPFA wanted the focus shifted 
back to employees thus they introduced ECA.  ECA successfully shifts the focus from 
employers back to employees and thus regain the fairness of the distribution of costs and 
benefits.  Moreover, ECA allows all employees to enjoy greater autonomy in the MPF 
market and enhances the market competition.  Therefore, it is considered that ECA is a 
fair policy tool. 
There are a few politicians criticising the problems of high cost level of MPF and 
unfair focus on employers.  As ECA is quite successful and precise in reducing the cost 
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level of MPF and shifting the focus from employers to employees, it is considered that 
ECA is a quite politically acceptable and supported policy tool. 
DIS 
DIS itself is a default core fund with its management fees capped at only 0.75% 
through legislation.  It does not only mean an extra fund introduced to the MPF market 
with low fee, but also a strong force influencing all other funds in the market to lower the 
cost level through its fee cap (a price ceiling) which will serve as a market benchmark.  
Moreover, DIS also tackles employees’ concern of making difficult MPF choice by 
directly engaging in the default core fund with its investment approach best designed to 
manage the long-term risks associated with investing retirement savings.  Therefore, DIS 
is expected to be successful and precise in achieving its desired policy outcomes on 
reducing the cost level of MPF and bettering investment choice.  Thus it is considered 
that DIS is an effective policy tool. 
The costs of DIS are just the one-off promulgation cost during the initial 
implementation stage and the recurrent administration cost for managing the default core 
fund.  Therefore, it is considered that DIS’s costs to society as a whole is low, thus DIS is 
an economically efficient policy tool. 
Although DIS interferes with the private market price setting through its fee cap, 
it is in fact just an extra fund introduced to the market with low fee to enhance market 
competition.  Moreover, it also offers a simplified choice for those employees who do not 
have the resources to make investment choice.  Therefore, it is considered that DIS is fair 
on the distribution of costs and benefits, thus it is a fair policy tool. 
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There was a motion debate at LegCo on January 10, 2013 on the problems of 
MPF including high fees, and urging for a comprehensive review of the MPF Scheme 
including setting a price ceiling for the Fund Expense Ratio. DIS directly addresses the 
concerns of the politicians by imposing a price ceiling on the default core fund and 
further influencing all other funds in the market to lower the price.  Moreover, according 
to the consultation Concluding Comments on the consultation paper “Providing Better 
Investment Solutions for MPF Members” released in March 2015, the majority of 
respondents (including political parties) indicated overall support for the core fund 
proposals (FSTB & MPFA, 2015).  Therefore, it is considered that DIS is a politically 
acceptable and supported policy tool. 
Concluding Comments 
The evaluation on the fitness of various policy tools of the MPF system by using 
the four evaluation criteria (i.e. effectiveness, economic efficiency, distributional fairness 
and political acceptability) is summarised in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1 - The evaluation on the fitness of various policy tools of the MPF system 
Policy Tools 
of MPF 
Evaluation Criteria for Fitness of Policy Tools 
Effectiveness Economic 
Efficiency 
Distributional 
Fairness 
Political 
Acceptability 
MPFO V N/A N/A O 
MPFA O V N/A O 
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The Code V V V V 
Compliance 
Standard 
O V V V 
Comparative 
Platform 
V V V V 
ECA O V V O 
DIS V V O V 
V –fulfil the evaluation criterion 
O – quite fulfil the evaluation criterion 
X – not fulfil the evaluation criterion 
According to Table 5.1, it is noted that the various policy tools of the MPF 
System can generally fulfil most of the criteria.  Among these policy tools, the Code and 
the Comparative Platform fulfil all the four criteria, and are thus the relatively fit policy 
tools of the MPF System.  Among the four criteria, economic efficiency is best fulfilled, 
but the effectiveness and political acceptability are relatively less fulfilled.  It indicates 
that the MPF System, though provides quite low cost to the society as a whole, is not 
very successful in achieving the desired outcomes for retirement protection and thus less 
supported by politicians.  In short, it is considered that the MPF System is a fit policy tool 
to match with the retirement problems in Hong Kong, but the effectiveness and political 
support would need to be strengthened. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion and Recommendations 
Introduction 
In previous chapters, the retirement protection scheme developments of Hong 
Kong and selected empirical data of the MPF System are discussed under the analytical 
framework of governance and policy tools approaches.  This chapter summarises the 
findings of previous chapters and provides a concluding discussion on the MPF System 
as a policy tool to match with the retirement problem in Hong Kong.  Macao and 
Singapore’s experiences of retirement protection are used to compare with that of Hong 
Kong for the purposes of showing how other societies similar to Hong Kong (in size, 
political setup, culture etc.) are dealing with the issue.  The chapter ends with discussion 
of the limitations of the project and a recommendation concerning the framework used to 
analyse the MPF System. 
Summary of Findings of Previous Chapters 
In the policy area of alleviating the potential impact of ageing population, it is 
noticed that the Hong Kong government adopted different governance modes with 
dominance of appropriate policy tools over the years.   The shift of governance over time 
has been separately analysed based on Knill & Tosun’s 4 ideal types of governance.  
Shifts were identified from Private Self-Governance to Interventionist Governance and 
the later Regulated Self-Governance since 1965.  
Reference to the World Bank multi-pillar-model proposed in “Averting the Old 
Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth”, the Hong Kong 
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government adopted the three pillars approach through the enactment of the MPF system.  
The MPF system as a mandatory, privately managed, fully funded contribution scheme 
was introduced as being the second pillar.  The MPF system is a reflection of Regulated 
Self-Governance mode with high cooperation between private and public sectors under 
the regulation of primary legislation.  In addition to applying Knill & Tosun’s (2002) 
theory, features of the MPF system including the MPFSO, the MPFA, Code on 
Disclosure for MPF Investment Funds, Compliance Standards for MPF Approved 
Trustees, Comparative Platform: Fees and Trustee Service, etc were classified with 
reference to Freiberg’s classification of policy tools.   
Since no one particular mode of governance is perfect, the appropriateness of the 
use of the MPF system as a policy tool and whether it reflects good governance was 
assessed.  Reference to Winfield and Rossell’s four evaluation criteria, it is considered 
that the MPF system is a quite fit policy tool to match with the retirement problem in 
Hong Kong. 
Selected Experience Beyond Hong Kong 
Having studied on Hong Kong’s MPF System for retirement protection, this 
project has drawn comparison from Macao and Singapore to show how similar societies 
are dealing with the issue.  The two societies chosen are not exactly comparable, but both 
have the closest similarities and acceptable differences compared with Hong Kong. All 
three cities were once colonies under European rule, and are more willing to adapt to 
changes in the developed world.  Whereas Hong Kong and Macao are both special 
administrative regions of China, the two cities are different in size and economy.  
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Singapore and Hong Kong are more comparable, but one is a sovereign state while the 
other is merely part of a much larger nation. 
Macao 
Macao has been a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China 
since 1999.  Much of the city’s revenues are generated from the gaming industry, and 
with a population of around 600,000, Macao generates one of the highest per capita Gross 
Domestic Product in the world after Qatar, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein (World 
Factbook, CIA). Macao is an affluent society. 
Continued economic development by the 1980s in Macao had prompted its 
society to aspire for the protection of local workers and the establishment of social 
security system.  In 1990, the Macao government introduced the Social Security Fund 
(SSF), nine years before the city was returned to China. 
SSF is under the Macao government and is currently subordinate to the Secretariat 
for Economy and Finance.  At the same time, the SSF enjoys administrative and financial 
autonomy, and is responsible for implementing various policy measures related to social 
security. 
At its establishment in 1990, the SSF provided social security for employees in 
the city with economic aid when they were old, unemployed and sick.  Although only 
employees working for others were allowed contribute to the SSF at its initial 
implementation, the coverage of the social security system has since extended in 
introducing voluntary contribution for the self employed and those who have stopped 
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working but with to continue making contributions. 
In addressing to the needs of the aging population, the Macao government 
announced “The Social Security and Old-age Pension System Reform Program” in 2008 
to build a double-tier social security system.  Whereas the first-tier social security system 
covers all Macao residents with basic social and an old-age protection, additional 
protection after workers retire is supported by the non-mandatory Central Provident Fund 
to be established in the future. 
In 2012, the setting up of the Provident Fund Individual Accounts laid the 
foundation for then non-mandatory Central Provident Fund System, a system comprises 
of contributions from employees and employers, and Macao advanced towards a double-
tier social security system. 
Singapore 
In Singapore, the needs of its population on retirement, healthcare and housing are 
addressed by the Central Provident Fund (CPF), a compulsory savings plan for working 
Singaporeans and permanent residents.  The CPF Board is the statutory body under the 
Ministry of Manpower, which oversees the CPF. 
The CPF was introduced by the British colonial government in 1955 when 
Singapore was still impoverished a decade after the end of World War II.  Both the 
employers and the employees make contributions to the employees’ account, and 
although the CPF was primarily set up to address the retiring needs of workers, it has 
since grown into a more comprehensive scheme that covers the retiring, housing, medical 
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and educational needs of contributors. 
There are four types of accounts in the CPF - Ordinary Account, Special Account, 
Medisave Account and Retirement Account.  Contributors of the CPF would save up in 
the first three accounts during their career, whereas the Retirement Account would be the 
combination of the Ordinary and Special Accounts upon a contributor’s retirement. 
Throughout the contributor’s career life, the contributions already made to the 
CPF could be withdrawn for various purposes like hospitalisation expenses and 
treatments, but more importantly, one’s CPF savings could be withdrawn for the purpose 
of home purchasing.  If a contributor’s account already exceeds certain amount of savings, 
the contributor could divert part of the savings to invest for higher returns. 
Summary and Lesson for Hong Kong 
In Macao and Singapore, the governments are in control of the retirement 
schemes of their working population.  In contrast, the Hong Kong government has more 
or less contracted out the operation of the MPF System to private institutions. 
In Macao, retirement protection is first-tier and basic, while the proposed Central 
Provident Fund is yet to be established, and contributions will only be on a voluntary 
basis.  Singapore’s CPF is comprehensive in covering not only retirement but also other 
important needs of the contributor, and provides much flexibility for contributors. 
As a small and focused economy, Macao can easily tackle the problem of an 
aging population by directing the revenues generated in the gaming industry to the social 
welfare system.  Since Singapore is a regional economic hub and financial centre, it is 
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keen to retain its competitiveness and ensure those people that work in the city-state will 
remain there.  Singapore will continue to adapt to changes in the world and enhance its 
CPF.  Hong Kong’s MPF System is definitely more developed as compared to Macao’s 
SSF, but is not as favourable when compared to the CPF in Singapore.  If Hong Kong is 
to improve the MPF System, Singapore’s CPF will always be a good comparison. 
Limitations and Recommendations 
The project adopts the approach of studying the evolution of governance and 
policy tools with a particular focus on the MPF System.  It emphasised on the 
development from 1965 to present.  It does not provide a full account on the discussion of 
retirement protection, as there are continuing debates and studies on other new proposals 
or schemes. 
Knill & Tosun’s mode of governance (2012) is a typology based on degree of 
cooperation between public and private sectors and the degree of legal obligation that 
characterises collective policy solutions to problems.  An evolution of governance is a 
mere reflection of change of policy tools.  This is simply a general description with no 
indication of good or bad. 
In a regime like Hong Kong with high private sector and state capacity, an 
adaptation of Regulated Self-Governance mode seems a good choice.  However, 
discussion on retirement protection in Hong Kong did not end with the introduction of the 
MPF System, rather, studies and debates continue.  Is the MPF System not an appropriate 
policy tool? Although using relevant evaluative criteria can assess the appropriateness of 
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policy tools, but how comprehensive are they?  In the project, the assessment based on 
Winfield and Rossell’s four evaluation criteria concludes that the MPF System is a fit 
policy tool to match with the retirement problem in Hong Kong.  In reality, the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of the MPF System are questionable. 
If the desired outcome of the MPF System is to provide adequate retirement 
protection to the society, it is presumed that the system can generate enough capital for 
the later retired population economically and effectively.  In fact, the effectiveness of the 
system is often being challenged.  The handling fee charged by intermediaries is too high 
when compared to the returns generated by the scheme.  The MPF System may be 
economical to operate for the whole society for now, however, it may not be effective to 
generate enough capital to meet future retirement need. 
Winfield and Rossell’s evaluation criteria only provide a general guideline in 
assessing the appropriateness.  Different policy tools have specific nature and therefore 
unique or more criteria are required for conducting a comprehensive assessment.  It is 
recommended to design policy specific evaluative criteria for assessment if opportunity 
arises. 
The study provides a framework of understanding the evolution of policy tools to 
match with the retirement problem in Hong Kong.  However, as the MPF System evolves, 
some tools may become irrelevant, more relevant or even the whole system being 
replaced by others.  As the policy evolves, it would be fruitful to revisit the topic with an 
attempt to offer policy recommendation to alleviate the impact of an ageing population. 
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Concluding Comments 
This project aims to put retirement protection in Hong Kong under the lens of the 
typology of governance and policy tools.  The evolution of governance mode in history 
against the change in terms of tools adopted by the government in this policy area has 
been the focus along the discussion.  It highlights the change of the government’s stance 
under the spectrum of retirement protection policy from a hands-off approach with a 
gradual increase in terms of the degree of participation and initiative.  The subsequent 
enactment of MPFSO in 1995 and the establishment of the MPFA in 2000 as a tool to use 
tools are discussed in length with its duality in role elaborated, supplemented with 
various types of policy tools which have been adopted. 
It is interesting to note, however, that there has been a greater degree of 
cooperation between the government and private sector in the furtherance of retirement 
protection, allowing the government to take a step backward from a hands-on approach, 
which could best be accounted under the mode of Regulated Self-Governance.  Relevant 
government policy together with the retirement protection as a whole in Hong Kong has 
also been benchmarked with the ideology under the World Banks’ Five-Pillar Model, 
which had also been developed from a Three-Pillar Model in order to meet with the 
demographic change in the society. 
Equally inspiring, the attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of MPF as a tool to 
provide retirement protection raise the concern of relevance and legitimacy of the four 
evaluation criteria purported by Winfield and Rossell.  A possible answer to this query 
may rest with the increasing reliance on the political capacity of a government in 
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governing a state and introducing new policy.  It is not uncommon to find in any part of 
the world that government with weak political power has generally met with greater 
difficulty in implementing new policies.  This may explain the difference between the 
theoretical appropriateness of the policy tools and their practical effectiveness from a 
realistic perspective as exemplified in this project. 
Last but not least, the examples from outside of Hong Kong in retirement 
protection have opened up the suggestions of a greater involvement of a government in 
the policy area under discussion.  This appears to be in contradiction against the 
Regulated Self-Governance mode in which a high degree of public-private cooperation 
was emphasised, raising the question of whether the Hong Kong government should 
further take up more responsibility in retirement protection.  After all, what is the 
ultimate function of the MPF System?  Is it a tool to provide retirement protection or 
rather, an economic incentive to boost the economy?  Through the implementation of the 
MPF System, the government upholds the belief of “small government and large market”.  
Is the positive non-interventionist approach the right policy under the arena of retirement 
protection? 
Apparently, these are all difficult questions for Hong Kong to answer, bearing in 
mind that there is no “perfect” policy and the controversial discussion on retirement 
protection in Hong Kong over the years with the government’s role and degree of 
participation being put under the spotlight.  In 2012, the Hong Kong government had 
once appointed Nelson Chow Wing-sun, chair-professor of social work and social 
administration at the University of Hong Kong, to research retirement protection plans 
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suitable for Hong Kong.  His suggestion of a universal pension scheme failed to secure 
consensus from the public in view of the concern on the financial position and 
sustainability of the government in this scheme.   Similarly, suggestions for retirement 
protection from other stakeholders in the society have not brought the issue forward but 
stirred up the discussion in the policy area only. 
Having said that, this project has provided an overview on the evolution of 
governance mode and hence the changes on how retirement protection is being 
deliberated in the society, with due regard to the various application of policy tools over 
the years, which have all been affirmatively accounted under the analytical framework 
from an academic perspective. 
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